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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
WALLACE MURPHY PLUM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14374 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-appellant Plum appeals from a verdict 
of guilty before a jury, tried the 3rd and 4th of December, 
1975 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall 
presiding, whereafter, he was sentenced to a term of one 
to fifteen years in the Utah State Penitentiary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, appellant seeks to have the verdict 
reversed and the case dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 3rd day of July, 1975, Saunders Coin 
Shop at 432 Twenty-fifth Street in Ogden, Utah was robbed 
by two gunmen. One Dennis Scott, who was running the 
store while the owner was on vacation, was the sole 
occupant. (R.4) The robbers took an assortment of gold 
and silver coins. There was no resemblance between 
either of the robbers and defendant Plum and none is 
claimed. Witness Scott couldn't identify any of the 
individual coins, only the type of coins and type of 
packaging. (R.12, 13 and 16) 
On July 7th, about 1:30 P.M., the defendant entered 
the Rust Coin and Gift Shop at 311 South Main Street in Salt 
Lake City with a satchel of coins. The coins were inventoried 
by Mr. Rust in Mr. Plum's presence. After inventorying the 
coins, Mr. Rust made Mr. Plum an offer in the sum of 
$2,850.00 for the coins. (R.66-67) Mr. Plum said he would 
check the offer and return, which he did in about two hours. 
At Mr. Rust's request, he left the coins overnight and said he 
would be in to pick up a check the next morning. Mr. Rust's 
shop had had a telephone call two days before notifying them 
of the coin robbery in Ogden and Mr. Rust noted that some of 
the coins were similar to the list from the Ogden robbery, 
however, other than this call, as a coin dealer, he had no 
reason to believe these coins were or might have been stolen. 
(R.80) 
On the next date, July 8th, Mr. Plum appeared at 
the Rust Coin Shop, was given his check for $2,850.00 by Mr. 
Rust and was arrested by Officer Peck for receiving stolen 
property. Mr. Saunders was there at the time and tentatively 
identified some of the coins as a portion of the coins that 
had been taken from his shop, although Mr. Saunders testi-
mony indicates he had not finished his inventory on the 
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8th of July. Mr. Plum was cooperative with the officers, 
told them where he got the coins, gave them a description 
of the person that he had received them from, where the 
person had told him the coins came from, to wit, a 
collection of his and his grandfather's. Mr. Plum gave 
Officer Peck a description of the person that he bought 
the coins from and told him that he bought them from him 
for $2,600.00. Officer Peck was not satisfied with the 
description is the reason that he gave for the arrest. 
In addition to Mr. Rust's testimony that he had 
no reason to believe that the coins were stolen other than 
the telephone call which had been received by his girl two 
days after the robbery. (H.77-80) Mr. Terry Pantelakis 
testified (R.150 et. seq.) that he is a licensed coin 
dealer; that on the morning of July 7th, a person answer-
ing the description given by Mr. Plum of the person that 
he bought the coins from came in and tried to sell him 
the coins which are in evidence which he identified as 
being similar to a portion of the coins that the man tried 
to sell him on July 7th. His description fit the descrip-
tion given to Mr. Plum to Officer Peck. He offered the man 
$2,300.00 for them, the man didn't want that, and he 
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offered him $2,500.00. (R.162) Pantelakis further 
testified that none of the coins were unusual and he had 
no reason to believe them to have been stolen or probably 
stolen at the time he made the offer of $2,500.00. 
Mr. Leo Van Komen testified that he was an agent 
or employee of Mr. Pantelakis and also described the person 
who had come in with the coins and indicated that he might 
go down to see Porky Plum at The Name Of The Game to try 
to sell the coins. He also had no reason to believe that 
the coins were stolen. Defense, in discussion with the 
court and prosecutor in chambers prior to starting the 
evidence, discussed the misjoinder of two crimes, to wit, 
receiving stolen property knowing the coins to have been 
stolen, and receiving stolen property believing the coins 
to have probably been stolen, and made a formal motion 
thereon by agreement after the testimony had started at 
the first recess. (R.et. seq.) 
Counsel also made a motion for a directed 
verdict on the basis of the information alleging two 
crimes, which motion was denied by Judge Hall at the end 
of the evidence. The case went to the jury on three 
verdicts: 1. Stating Mr. Plum to be guilty of knowingly 
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receiving stolen property as alleged in the information. 
2. On Mr. Plum being guilty of receiving stolen property 
believing the property to have probably been stolen. 3. On 
a basis of not guilty. The jury, after due deliberation, 
returned with the middle verdict which, in effect, consti-
tutes a finding of not guilty as to the knowingly been 
stolen charge. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
76-408, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AMENDED BY 
THE LAWS OF UTAH 1975 is VOID FOR VAGUENESS, STATING TWO 
CRIMES THEREIN HAVING DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND QUANTUMS OF 
PROOF AND NOT INFORMING PERSONS WHO WOULD BE LAW ABIDING 
OF THE CRITERION THEY MUST MEET NOT TO VIOLATE THE LAW. 
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court in 
Musser, et al v. State of Utah 333 US 95 103; 92 LEd 563 
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah for determination of whether the statute under which 
the case was brought, our old unlawful cohabitation 
statute, was void for vagueness. The Court citing and 
discussing it under headnote 1, the language of that 
statute states: 
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"Statutes defining crime run afoul of 
the due process clause if they fail to give 
adequate guidance to those who would be law 
* abiding to advise defendants of the nature x 
of the offense of which they are charged or 
to guide courts in trying those who are 
accused." 
After being referred back to the Utah Supreme 
Court, this Court in an opinion written by Justice 
Latimer determined the language of that statute to be 
"void for vagueness" at Utah , 175 P.2d 725. 
The objectionable language in the Musser case was "to 
commit acts injurious to public morals", the court hold-
ing that the general language was too broad to either 
(a) advise the defendants of the nature of the offense 
of which they are being charged or (b) to guide courts 
in trying those who are accused. 
In the case at bar is "receiving stolen property, 
believing it to have probably been stolen". The complaint 
under which Mr. Plum was initially charged at preliminary 
hearing charged him only with having received stolen prop-
erty belonging to Saunders Coin Shop knowing it to have 
been stolen. The information alleged in the alternative 
the two bases knowing it to have been stolen or believing 
it to have probably have been stolen. It would appear 
that the framers of the statute Title 76-6-408 made more 
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error than the vagueness and ambiguity in putting two 
crimes with different criterion of evidence in the same 
section then adding three presumptions, none of which is 
applicable in this case to suffice for an inference of 
"knowledge or belief". An extensive annotation on vague-
ness or indefiniteness of the statute as rendering it 
unconstitutional or inoperative is to be found in 
70 LEd 322 and an illustration as to when a statute 
defining a criminal offense is subject to attack as 
vague, indefinate or uncertain is found in a further 
extensive annotation at 83 LEd 893/ Conley v. General 
Construction Company at 269 US 70 LEd 322, the case of 
Claude C. Conley v. General Construction Company: 
"The terms of the penal statute creating 
a new offense must be sufficiently 
explicit to inform those who are subject 
to what conduct on their part will render 
liable to its penalties". 
Further, from the same citation at page 323 
of the Law Edition citation: ^ » 
"Statutes which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential 
of due process of law". 
Compare the language complained of in the 
information (R.195) "or believing that it probably had been 
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stolen and the verdict signed by foreman of the jury 
Ronald J. Whitehead: (R.233) 
"We the jurors impaneled in the above 
case find the defendant Wallace Murphy Plum 
aka Porky Plum guilty of theft by receiving 
believing said property probably had been 
stolen as charged in the information". 
. f POINT TWO o
 } 
INSTRUCTION NO- 7 (R.209) AND INSTRUCTION 
NO. 10 (R.212) CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE VERDICT RETURNED 
BY THE JURY (R.233). THE COURT IN INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (R.205) 
AND INSTRUCTION NO. 8, SUBPARAGRAPH 4 (R.210) GIVES THE 
JURY AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED TWO ALTERNATIVES: 
(a) THAT THE DEFENDANT "RECEIVED THE PROPERTY INVOLVED 
AND KNEW IT WAS STOLEN OR BELIEVED THAT IT HAD PROBABLY 
BEEN STOLEN". (Emphasis Added) 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines 
probable as follows: 
"Having the appearance of truth; having the 
character of probability; appearing to be 
founded in reason or experience. State v. 
Thiele, 119 Iowa, 659 NW 256. Having more 
evidence for than against; iTipported by 
evidence which inclines the mind to believe, 
but leaves some room for doubt; likely". 
Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray, Mass 271 
distinguishes between knowledge and belief as follows: 
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"'Knowledge1 consists in the perception 
of the truth of affirmative or negative 
propositions, while 'belief admits of all 
degrees from the slightest suspicion to the 
fullest assurance. The difference between 
them is ordinarily merely in the degree, to 
be judged of by the court, when addressed 
to the court; by the jury, when addressed to 
the jury". 
The Court defined knowingly in Instruction 
No. 9 (R.211) as follows: 
"A person engages in conduct 'knowingly' 
or with knowledge, with respect to his con-
duct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reason-
ably certain to cause the result". 
It then defines believing and probably in 
Instruction No. 10 (R.212) as follows: 
"you are instructed that the work 
'believing' means 'having a belief or 
opinion.' In other words, 'to believe 
that a fact exists.' The word 'probably' 
means 'likely to occur, but involving an 
element of uncertainty'" 
The underlined words cannot be reconciled in 
any way with the Court's definition of reasonable doubt 
given in Instruction No. 7. (R.209) 
The writer has no quarrel with the Court's 
definition of knowingly nor with its definition of 
reasonable doubt . Apparently, the jury was unable to 
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determine that the defendant knew that it probably was 
stolen as they return the verdict unsigned (R.230) and 
went on to consider the verdict with the tenuous language, 
"Guilty of theft by receiving believing said property 
probably had been stolen". 
How was it possible in determining the element 
of intent and fail to find that the defendant "knew" 
property was stolen and yet find beyond a reasonable doubt 
a belief that the property had probably been stolen. In 
the face of the definitions given by the court in 
Instructions 9 and 10, supra, differentiating between 
knowledge and belief is confusing and almost impossible. 
The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma has 
addressed itself to the same situation in the use of 
practically identical words in the case of Weaver v. State, 
235 P. 635, wherein reversing a conviction in a receiving 
stolen goods case the court states at page 636 of the 
Pacific citation: 
"The words 'or that she knew such facts 
as would lead her to believe it was stolen1 
in the first paragraph, and the words 'in all 
probability ....that is sufficient as to her 
knowledge of it being stolen,1 just preceding 
the last paragraph, are erroneous. Pickering 
v. U.S., 2 Okl. Cr. 197, 101 P. 123; State v. 
Rountree, 80 S.C. 387, 61 S.E. 1072, 22 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 833. See also Davis v. State, 18 Okl 
Cr. 112, 193 P.745; McGill v. State, 6 Okl 
Cr. 512, 120 P. 297; Price v. State, 9 Okl 
Cr. 359, 131 P. 1102". 
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and again at page 637 of the same citation: 
"There is a further vice in the 
instruction above set out, in that the 
jury are told not that belief that the 
property was stolen would be sufficient 
proof of knowledge, but that the exist-
ence of facts which would 'lead her to 
believe,' or knowledge of facts 
as made her believe 'in all probability' 
would suffice. This is less than the 
law requires, and is erroneous." 
It is apparent that the court in that case and 
all the cases cited thereunder felt that the jury was 
confused by the instructions, but it is to be noted that 
in all those cases cited the criterion is to find that the 
defendant knowingly violated the law and the question of 
belief and probability goes only to the determination of 
the elements concerning whether the defendant knew. 
POINT III 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT A VERDICT OF EITHER KNOWING THE PROPERTY TO BE 
STOLEN OR BELIEVING THAT THE PROPERTY HAD PROBABLY BEEN 
STOLEN. 
The jury apparently determined that there was 
not sufficient evidence to determine the defendant know-
ingly received stolen property as set forth in Point I, 
supra. A search of the records reveals no evidence that 
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would cause the defendant or an ordinarily prudent man 
to know or even believe that the property was probably 
stolen. Neither Mr. Plum's actions or the conduct of the 
other people show any basis for that determination. In 
fact, the evidence is to the contrary. 
The defendant did not attempt to conceal the 
property that he brought into the shop of Mr. Rust, a 
licensed dealer, in the middle of the day, during regular 
business hours and waited while Mr. Rust inventoried the 
property. Although Mr. Rust had known him before, he did 
not act differently than usual (R.74), did not appear 
nervous or secretive, nor try to keep the coins out of 
sight. (R.75) All of the coins and packaging material 
were common in the coin business. (See Mr. Rust's 
testimony R.77 to R.80) 
Mr. Plum received Mr. Rust's offer of $2,850.00; 
agreed to check with his seller and bring the coins back 
later, which he did. He agreed to leave the coins over-
night and to come back for his money the next day; he 
did not object to a check in his name, rather than cash. 
(R.79 to R.81) Other than a telephone call which had 
been received by one of Mr. Rust's employees concerning 
an Ogden robbery, Mr. Rust, a licensed and long-time coin 
dealer, had no reason to believe the coins were stolen. 
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(R.80) Mr. Pantelakis had also inventoried the coins, 
which were brought to him on the morning of July 7th by 
a person of similar description to Mr. Plum's description 
to Officer Peck of the individual from whom he, Mr. Plum, 
had received the coins. Mr. Pantelakis offered $2,300.00 
and then $2,500.00 for the coins in evidence, together 
with others which were not received by Mr. Plum. 
Mr. Pantelakis, who had been a coin dealer for 
twenty years (R.153) had no reason to believe the coins 
to have been stolen at the time he inventoried them. (R.154) 
Mr. Plum was cooperative with the police and 
answered all appropriate questions asked by Officer Peck 
until he was arrested and handcuffed, when he became 
uncooperative. (R.86 to R.102) There is no scentilla of 
evidence in the record that defendant was aware that the 
Saunders Coin Shop in Ogden had been robbed, nor is there 
any evidence that he knew or had reason to believe that the 
coins he took to Mr. Rust were probably stolen property. 
Why should he know or suspect the coins to be stolen prop-
erty when two people with long experience in the business, 
Mr. Rust and Mr. Pantelakis, had no reason on the same 
date to so believe. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 1973 Utah Legislature on the afternoon of 
the last day of the session, passed an entirely new 
compilation of our Substantive Criminal Code Title 76 
without a complete reading of the 143-page bill and, as 
a matter of fact, without the review or final approval 
of the committee assigned to rewrite the then existing 
code. This legislation has caused considerable consterna-
tion, much of which this Court has been made aware. 
Part of that Code is 76-6-408, entitled 
"Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers". It 
will be noted that Paragraph 1 makes a person commit theft 
if he receives, retains or disposes of property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it has 
probably been stolen, then and in the same sentence, makes 
one guilty of theft who conceals, sells, withholds or aids 
in concealing, selling or withholding any such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen and 
omitting the phrase "or belief that it probably had been 
stolen." The Legislature then goes on in Paragraph 2(a) 
(b)(c) and (d) to make certain presumptions upon which 
knowledge or belief can be based. Subparagraphs (a) and 
(b) appear to be general, but subparagraphs (c) and(d) 
apply to special classifications, to wit, pawnbrokers or 
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secondhand dealers. It would seem clear that the language 
of Paragraph 1 is so vague and ambiguous as to leave the 
ordinarily prudent person guessing as to when he was 
commiting a crime. This legislation should be declared 
void for ambiguity and vagueness. 
Even if 77-6-408 were crystal clear, the Court's 
instructions were properly excepted to (R.182-183) and 
were used as a basis for a motion for a directed verdict. 
(R.165-166) Even the trial court at R.23 in discussing 
the problem of alternate crimes with a different, burden 
of proof seems to be bothered when it inquired of Mr. 
Yocom: 
"On your opening statement and I believe 
again in your argument now, I think you have 
referred to this phrase as deleting the word 
probably and merely saying believing that it 
had been stolen. And am I correct in that 
view? Are you having some difficulty with 
the work probably?" 
Further, with regard to Point III, an exhaustive 
search of the record shows no evidence that Mr. Plum knew 
of the robbery in Ogden at the time he disposed of the 
coins to Mr. Rust, nor is there any evidence that he had 
reason to believe that the coins were stolen. He paid 
$2,600.00 for them; Mr. Pantelakis had offered $2,300.00 
then $2,500.00 for the same coins, together with others. 
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It is requested that the court find the 
statute in itself to be void for vagueness or, in the 
alternative, to reverse on the basis of the Court's 
instructions 1, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as set forth in Point II 
and on the additional basis of the insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
Respectfully submitted 
SUMNER 31 HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to 
Mr. Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, Attorney 
for Plaintiff-Respondent, Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake 
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